Downing Street Says » Iraq Study Group (ISG)-Middle East

The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) told journalists about the Prime Minister’s video conference with the ISG earlier today. The PMOS said that he was not going to brief in any way the discussion as a whole and what the ISG had asked the Prime Minister because what we wanted to do was to respect the process of the ISG in its own right. The Prime Minister told the ISG that that what he believed was needed was a plan for Iraq, and a plan for the region as a whole that focused firstly on resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The Prime Minister said he believed the Iraqi government increasingly wanted to take control of its own affairs, and do so in a way which brought together the country as a whole. Our aim should be to support them.

The plan for Iraq, therefore, should be:

However, the Prime Minister also said that the Iraqi Government recognised that what happened outside the country was as important as developments inside Iraq. The biggest single factor, he said, in getting moderate Muslim countries to support a new Iraq, would be if there was progress on Israel and Palestine as part of a strategy for the Middle East as a whole – a point the Prime Minister made repeatedly to the group. That, the Prime Minister said, was important both in its own right, but also, to take away the issue which was most exploited by extreme elements around the region. The way to stop the radicalisation of moderate Muslim opinion was to have a positive strategy on resolving that issue.

Only that way could you put it up to those who have opposed our position, such as Iran, who he described as the strategic threat to the region. The way to deal with Iran was not to back down on our demands, but to take away their ability to exploit Muslim opinion, and to confront both it and Syria with the strategic choice of whether to be part of the solution, or face isolation.

Asked if we should be looking at hosting grand conferences, diplomatic initiatives, more effort by Washington etc in the region, and what happened now, the PMOS said that people should remember first and foremost that the Prime Minister had spoken about this in July in the LA speech. He had also spoken then about the need to operationlise this, i.e. to work out a way forward. The way to do that was with our allies, and obviously the US was a very important part of that, but also with the players on the ground. That was why the Prime Minister visited the region earlier in the Autumn, and why he still intended to return before the end of the year. Therefore, in terms of how it was worked out, first of all, there should be discussions with allies. Clearly, the Prime Minister putting his views to the ISG was part of that. What the ISG did and what they said was entirely up to them.

Asked if the Prime Minister thought that there was a realistic chance of getting a deal between Israel and Palestine, the PMOS replied that the Prime Minister believed that everyone knew what the solution was in terms of a two-state solution and recognising Israel’s need for security and Palestine’s need to be recognised as a state. In terms of getting there, the Prime Minister that, yes, it was realistic, and that if it was not worked for, then the ground was being surrendered to extremists who would say that we were not interested in finding a solution for Palestine. We were interested in finding a solution, both for Palestine and Israel, as it was in the interests of both.

Asked if the Prime Minister had any confidence that the ISG would come forward with a global plan for Israel and Palestine and also, during the discussion, was there any further talk of getting the troops out of Iraq, the PMOS said that regarding troops, we would stay until the job was done. With regards to the global plan, the PMOS said that he was not going to breach the terms he had stated on what he would and would not say, not least because the ISG was still at the evidence gathering stage. The PMOS said that the ISG was a serious group of people, with a serious amount of experience, and today was a serious conversation.

Asked if the Prime Minister thought that Iran and Syria were encouraged to be part of the solution, and what was their thinking, the PMOS said that we were still waiting a serious response to Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s visit to Damascus, and we would expect to be waiting at this stage. The important thing was that as we had said, we had put it up to Iran and Syria that they had a strategic choice to make. Did they want to be part of the solution, or did they want to face isolation? By moving ahead on Israel and Palestine, we believed that the central issue was removed that they exploited to stop progress. It also enable moderate Muslim opinion to support moves towards not only an Israel and Palestine solution, but also, to a pluralist and peaceful Iraq. That therefore was the strategy.

Asked if the Prime Minister would like to go to Iran and Syria to talk to them straight, the PMOS said that as people knew, we had been to Syria recently. What we were prepared to do was explore their thinking, and that was why Sir Nigel visited to Syria. We did have diplomatic relations with Iran, and we used them. The important point was that we put forward a positive strategy, rather than a defense strategy, and that that was put forward not only in Iraq, but across the region as a whole. We did not just sit back, but actually put forward a positive strategy that we believed not only ourselves, Europe, the US, but also moderate Muslim opinion in the region could support.

Asked for further information about the ISG discussion, the PMOS said that he was not going to talk about the meeting. He added that the Prime Minister had made an opening statement after a general welcome from James Baker, and then responded to questions from around the table in Washington. The meeting was around an hour long.

Asked on either Iraq or the Middle East, did the Prime Minister think that things could move on without Iran or Syria, the PMOS replied that the important point was that the Prime Minister used the phrase " an arc of moderation" in his LA speech. Therefore, it was important to put forward a positive forward-looking strategy which addressed the main issue and dispute at the centre of the Middle East, which was Israel and Palestine. By doing so, it allowed as many people as possible to join in the effort to try and stabilise the Middle East and get a better future for the Middle East. In that circumstance, Syria and Iran had a choice: they either joined, or they did not, but that was a matter for them.

Asked if the Prime Minister mentioned or did he favour the idea of a regional conference that brought together all the parties, the PMOS replied that what people needed to agree was a strategy going forward, then the format in which that was done needed to be addressed. The PMOS said that he had no doubt that these were issues which were going to be thought about by many people, perhaps even the ISG. However, in terms of the format, that was secondary to agreeing the strategy first.

Asked if Iran and Syria would have to join with the US as part of the solution, or would they have to take unilateral action, and if so, what would that action be, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had spelt out yesterday what Iran in particular, but also Syria, had to do. That was to stop supporting terrorism, stop being an obstacle to progress in the Middle East peace process, and to support Lebanon, which was a sovereign country and which should be allowed to decide its own future without outside interference. Those were all issues which had been spoken about before. What the Prime Minister was saying was that the issue was put up to Iran and Syria, rather than waiting for them. Were they going to be part of a positive move forward, or were they not? If there was support from around the region, that put it up even more to Iran and Syria.

Asked if we had anything to say about the Daily Telegraph’s suggestion today that there were growing links between Iran and Al Qaeda, the PMOS said that we had expressed our concern in the past about Iran’s support for terrorism. The PMOS said that he was not going to comment directly on the story, however.

Put that the opening statement did not address what was really happening in a civil war in Iraq, and that it was not addressing the central problem of getting peace in Iraq and the Middle East, the PMOS said that what the journalist had left out was that there was now a democratically elected Government, and that it was a representative Government whose members on a daily basis put their lives at risk to represent Iraq as a whole. The PMOS said that there was an Iraqi army which was increasingly capable. There were two provinces which we had already handed over to Iraqi control, and there were a series of other provinces which were virtually at the point where they would be able to take control. The Iraqi Government as a whole was increasingly anxious to, and wanted to, take control of its own destiny, and it recognised that it needed to root out the problems of sectarianism. It recognised that it needed to address the issue of how money was dispersed in a fair way throughout the country. It also recognised the need to equip its army in a full way, but it also recognised that the solution lay in settling the region as a whole. In terms of the Middle East, it was recognised what the solution was, i.e. a two-state solution.

There had been a lot of work done with regards to thinking through how that solution was reached from where we were. Were there difficulties on the ground, both in Iraq, and in the Middle East as a whole? Answer: of course there were, and nobody had denied that. Equally, in any peace process, and in any process such as this, people never started from a situation in which there were no events on the ground which could pose difficulties, or was a completely calm situation. If there was such a situation, then there would be no need for a peace process. What always had to be done was impose a strategy on events, rather than let events impose a strategy on you. That was where we were at. The PMOS said that he well remembered ten years ago people writing that Northern Ireland was a problem to which there was no solution. It had taken a long time, but we were hopefully almost there.

Asked if the Prime Minister had said if any mistakes had been made, did he ask about the dispersal of oil money and did he discuss benchmarking and withdrawal of troops, as was being put out in Washington at the moment, the PMOS said that benchmarking was not discussed. With regards to dispersing money, it was recognised that there had to be a way of dispersing money within the system that all parts of Iraq regarded as fair. In terms of mistakes, the PMOS said that the meeting was a forward-looking one, not backward-looking.

Asked if the Prime Minister had said we might be able to withdraw our troops, and also, did he give any suggestion that Syria would be easier to bring on board than Iran, given Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the PMOS said that in terms of troops, as he had already said, we would stay until the job was done. We had set out the process by which we would draw down troops, but conditional on the capability of the Iraqi army. That position had not changed, and would not change. As the Prime Minister had said in his speech yesterday Syria and Iran should not be combined. Both did have to make a strategic choice as to whether they were part of the solution or face isolation. Therefore, what had to be done was find the best way of putting that strategic choice up to the two countries.

Asked if the Prime Minister’s own timetable for departure would come into this discussion, as they were looking forward, not back, the PMOS said again that he was not going to get into the details of the discussion. However, the Prime Minister’s departure was not an issue that was in any way part of the meeting today.

Asked if there had been any detailed discussion on the police or the army, and was there an exchange of views about what should be done, the PMOS replied that the discussion on that point was not that detailed. However, this was one of the most serious and thoughtful discussions on these issues he had heard, as a whole for some time. This was a serious group of people who were addressing the issue in a very serious way. There was a strategic level and an operational level.

Asked if it was fair to say that what was happening was a recognition that we could not go on the way we were, the PMOS said that if people looked at the LA speech, and what the Prime Minister had said in his foreign policy speeches, there was a common theme. That theme was that the issue of Palestine had to be addressed, as it was the core issue at the heart of the Middle East. That had been a repeated theme of the Prime Minister for many years, not just many months.

Asked if there was a sense that it had got lost along the way, the PMOS replied that the Prime Minister would seize whatever opportunities there were to put forward that case.

Asked with regards to troops in the British sector, was this something that was taken into account of what the Americans decided to do, and on what basis did the UK Government decide on a timetable, and what was the Prime Minister’s view was post US Elections, the PMOS said that the American elections had not changed our view on this in any way. Our view had always been that as and when the Iraqi forces were judged by the Iraqi Government, in consultations with the coalition as a whole, that they were capable of taking control, that would happen. That had already happened in two provinces in Iraq, and it would happen in other provinces as and when they were ready. Therefore, it was a matter of record for quite some time precisely what the strategy was. Nothing had changed since the US elections.

Asked if we thought that Sunnis and Shias blowing each other up were because they did not have a Palestinian state the PMOS replied that what we thought was that extremists used the conflict between Israel and Palestine as part of their radicalisation approach. In terms of other issues, it would be much easier to address those issues if moderate Muslim opinion could be convinced that people were serious about getting a settlement which from their perspective recognised Palestine as a state, whilst at the same time, gave Israel the security that it needed and deserved.

Put that the Prime Minister had always clearly been serious about getting a settlement, and did we think that that message had not got across to moderate Muslims, and if not, why not, the PMOS replied that if people analysed how radicalisation worked, Israel and Palestine did have an essential part in that. Equally, it was moving beyond talking to actually getting a resolution. If there was a resolution, then any serious observer would recognise that that would have a major impact on stabilising opinion within the region.

Asked what did Syria and Iran fear from isolation, the PMOS said that if someone was in Iran and they saw a capital market going down by a third in a year, or if they were in Syria and they had seen their economy stagnating, or if people wanted to bring their economies up to the standard of others in the Middle East, then people might want to think about whether they were pursuing the right strategy. However, if people were also facing a united opposition from moderate Muslim countries as a whole, that might make people think twice.

Put that they were not, though, the PMOS said that in terms of Syria, we had visited Damascus, and we thought that it was a worthwhile visit. In terms of Iran, as the Prime Minister had said, what firstly needed to be done was to put it up to them, and wait for the response. If people sat back and said there was no point, then they were just endorsing the status quo.

Put that there was no evidence that the other states in the Middle East were interested in isolating Syria or Iran, the PMOS said that in terms of our conversations, there was some evidence. What we had to do was get to a situation in which it was more possible for those moderate Muslim countries to articulate that view. That was more likely to happen as part of the drive for a settlement with Israel and Palestine than if people simply sat back and accepted the status quo. That was the central argument. What were the circumstances which were most likely to unite moderate Muslim opinion, and to get the arc of moderation moving forward together? The Prime Minister’s view was that a plan for the region as a whole, as well as a plan for Iraq was the way to do that.

1 Comment »

Blair slapped down by his Washington mentors again:

<a href="http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=18309">http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=18309</a>
Comment by Roberto — 15 Nov 2006 on 7:49 pm | Link

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» Tuesday, November 14, 2006

Iraq Study Group (ISG)-Middle East

The plan for Iraq, therefore, should be:

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