Downing Street Says

Asked what the Prime Minister had meant at PMQ’s when he talked about provocation if our troops did not withdraw progressively in Iraq, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said the Prime Minister meant the same as what Richard Dannatt had meant. Which was that when you had a situation as we had in Iraq for example with Australian troops where they withdrew from an area, but then went back in again. In that circumstance the Iraqis saw that as a provocation. However, that did not mean you should generalize what you had heard at PMQ’s into hinting it meant all out withdrawal. It did not. Since April 2004 we had had a process of Iraqisation. This meant that as and when Iraqi troops were capable of taking on the security role, and when the Iraqi Government shared that judgment, then we would progressively withdraw. But this depended on the conditions on the ground. It did not depend on setting an arbitrary date.

Asked if the Prime Minister accepted that British troops could be seen as a provocation if they were in some areas of Iraq, the PMOS said the Prime Minister had been saying that in areas where people had got used to Iraq troops then you have to think very carefully about how you deployed outside troops. Equally as the Prime Minister had said the reverse was true in Basra, were the presence of British troops was absolutely essential to the operations being carried out by Iraqi troops, that bit had been left out of ITN’s lunchtime coverage. That was fully backed and supported by the Iraqi Government. When we were in Baghdad in May, there had not been a single leader, Sunni, Kurd or Shia who had wanted us to leave immediately.

Put that those qualifications had not been in what the Prime Minister said at PMQ’s, the PMOS said those qualifications had been in everything that had been said by the Prime Minister since this whole issue came to light. We had always made it clear that this was not an arbitrary deadline. The process of Iraqisation depended on two things. Firstly the ability of the Iraqi forces to take the load and secondly the wishes of the Iraqi Government. Reporting it without putting in those conditions in was totally meaningless.

Put that the Prime Minister had just said there could be provocations, the PMOS said the qualifications were also in what Richard Dannatt had said. Qualification had always been there in what we said. You had to use troops carefully, which was what we always did. That did not however, in anyway undermine the basic case, which was that the Iraqi Government had asked the multinational force to stay. The UN had asked us to stay. We would stay until the Iraqi forces were capable of taking the load and until the Iraqi Government, which was the democratically elected Government, asked us to leave.

Asked whether it was right to think we would not be sticking around forever, the PMOS asked why that statement surprised the journalist. Put that they were surprised at why the Prime Minister had referred, twice, to the eighteen month calendar today, the PMOS said given the way it had been reported recently perhaps that was a suggestion that he felt he needed to make the case again. The PMOS reminded journalists what the Prime Minister had said when in Iraq. The Prime Minister had said we were not there forever, we would be there as long as the Iraqi Government want us to be. We were there for as long as the Iraqi security forces need us to be there. That had been the basic position since April 2004.

Asked if the Government was convinced they would have everything in place in eighteen months, the PMOS said in terms of time scales what you could only say was that you hoped the Iraqi forces would be able to be at such a stage, within that sort of time period. What you could not do was tie yourself to an arbitrary deadline, which the Prime Minister would not do.

Put that it was difficult to withdraw a significant number of troops, the PMOS said what they were saying was that the process of training Iraqi forces was such that you could project forward, and see at what point you believed you could be able to take the load. However, what the Prime Minister had made absolutely clear was that it depended on the conditions at the time. It was not an arbitrary deadline.

Put that the Prime Minister had quoted Gerneral Casey as saying the deadline was eighteen months and was that our policy, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had said exactly the same thing when he had appeared at the Liasion Committee. That had been our policy for quite sometime. So why were journalists surprised that he repeated that policy. That was the logical outflow of the process of Iraqisation that we first announced in April 2004.

Asked if we aimed to get as many troops out by as early as 2008, the PMOS said the aim was to get troops out whenever the Iraqi forces had reached capability, and when the Iraqi Government judged that they had done so.

Put that the Prime Minister had said give no quarter whereas the military appeared wobbly, the PMOS said the phrase from Richard Dannatt interview was that there not a cigarette paper between his position, the Prime Minister’s or the Defence Secretary’s.

Put that there was a difference between what the Prime Minister was saying today to what he had said yesterday, the PMOS said the Prime Minister had always said it depends on the conditions on the ground and those conditions are capability of the Iraqi forces, and the views of the Iraqi Government. That was the position articulated in Baghdad, that was the position he articulated before the Liaison Committee.

Put that when Richard Dannatt had spoken about downgrading our position in Iraq that this was not something the Prime Minister agreed with, the PMOS said that what Richard Dannatt had said on the Today Programme was that he still wanted to see a unity state. We agreed. He still wanted to see a democratic state. We agreed. He still wanted to see an Iraq in which the Government was in charge of security in Iraq as a whole. We agreed. He wanted to see a prosperous economy. We agreed. Therefore, that was the Prime Minister saw as the objective of what we were doing in Iraq. Put that the PMOS was saying that Richard Dannatt’s explanation on Today Programme was what the downgraded ambition would be, the PMOS said he would not try and analyse prceisely what Richard Dannatt’s words were. As the Prime Minister had said on Friday, we agreed with what he had said on the Today Programme.

Put that the more deaths there were the more people linked it to troop provocation or Iraqisation failure, the PMOS said firstly that he hated talking about anybody’s death. However, that analysis was based on a misconception. The vast number of deaths in Iraq were not actually our troops, though one death was one too many, the vast number of deaths were innocent Iraqi civilians killed, not by coalition troops, but by the terrorists. Therefore you had to take that into account whenever you were trying to put forward an analysis. Put that the car bombs were protesting the presence of the coalition, the PMOS said if you actually analysed the number of incidents involving coalition forces it was relatively small compared to the overall total. The terrorist campaign was primarily aimed at was overthrowing the democratically elected, multi party, government not the coalition force.

Asked what the Prime Minister wished to achieve, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister wanted a democratically elected government able to exercise it’s authority through out all of Iraq where Iraqi citizens could live without the threat of terrorism.

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» Wednesday, October 18, 2006

Iraq

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