Downing Street Says » Prime Minister’s Speech

The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) told journalists that the speech was primarily an analysis of why Britain needed to have a foreign policy which gave equal weight to its relationship with America and with the EU, and why the Prime Minister totally rejected any idea that Britain could have in some way an isolationist foreign policy.

The PMOS read out the last sentence of the speech as it stood at the time which said that "…in today’s world, a foreign policy based on strong alliances was the only British policy which worked". The PMOS said that given the headlines this morning, the PMOS said that he’d like to focus first of all on what the Prime Minister would say about Iraq. The key starting point for the Prime Minister on Iraq was what the Iraq Government and people through its government actually wanted, and that was to take more control and responsibility for themselves.

To achieve that, the Prime Minister had set out what he believed were the constituent parts, and he highlighted four points. Firstly, the need for a strong political compact in Iraq itself, which was led by the Iraqi Government and which brought all the parties together with a clear commitment to non-sectarian government and democracy. Secondly, that we built a stronger Iraqi governing capability, particularly in terms of dispersing money for reconstruction and rebuilding the economy, which everyone in Iraq recognised was fair. Thirdly, that we helped the Iraqi army with its capability in terms of training, equipment and command and control, which in turn would allow us to begin a process of drawdown. Fourthly, and this was where the headlines were conflicting, the need for a whole Middle East strategy. The basis for this should not be unfamiliar to anyone who read or heard the Prime Minister’s speech in Los Angeles on the Middle East. At the heart of that analysis, was the need for peace involving Palestine and Israel and the drive for a settlement there. As part of that, however, we needed to put a strategic choice to Iran and Syria as to whether they played a positive or negative role. Did they continue to try to undermine the Lebanese Government, or support it as a sovereign country, and what was their attitude to Israel? Did they continue to support terrorism? The PMOS said that none of this was new in that if people went back to the LA speech, the Prime Minister in answer to the very first question said the following:

That was what the Prime Minister had said in August to the LA Affairs Council. Therefore, the key point was that we gave Syria and Iran a strategic choice, and that would be the point of any dialogue with them, and was the point of our dialogue with them, and has been the point of our dialogue with them.

Asked if countries that failed the test of being supportive of the Middle East context be part of a solution in Iraq, the PMOS said that if countries were destabilising the region, then it was difficult to see how they could be part of stabilising the region. People could not, on the one hand, destabilise Iraq and yet hope for a peaceful and stable Middle East. Iraq was a sovereign and democratically elected Government, and it would choose its relationship with Iran and Syria, as it was not for us to dictate. Equally, however, Iran and Syria could play a much more constructive role, for example, with the Lebanese Government, or by trying to get a settlement in Israel and Palestine. It had to be approached as a whole, not part by part.

Put that it seemed that Iran was arming militias to send weapons across to Iraq, and how could we have a dialogue and was anything being done to stop them sending weapons, the PMOS said that with regards to the attack on Sunday, it was too soon to comment. However, in terms of our concerns about Iran’s actions in Iraq, especially around Basra, we had expressed those explicitly. If people looked at what the Prime Minister had said after the informal summit last October, he had highlighted that at Hampton Court. In terms of dialogue, what was important was that people did not believe that we were simply not talking to them for whatever reason. Instead, the important point was that we were willing to talk, but about playing a constructive role. As the Prime Minister had said in LA, if people continued to support terrorism, then they had to be prepared for the implications of that in terms of our relationship with them. There could be a better relationship, but only on the right terms.

Put that this did not bear any reality to the situation, as we knew that they were doing something completely different by actively promoting terrorism in Iraq, the PMOS replied that firstly, we had always had diplomatic relations with Iran, so this was not new. Secondly, the Prime Minister had talked in August, and again now, about facing Iran and Syria, and people should not necessarily combine the two, as they were separate, with a strategic choice. The PMOS said that making it clear that relations depended on their response was what we were about. The fact was that what people had done in the past did not necessarily dictate what they did in the future, but people needed to be seen to be making that choice.

Put that it was not the first time that the Iranians were sending a message that was written in solders’ blood, and also that the explosives used on Sunday seemed to have come out Iran, the PMOS said again that it was too soon to determine the source of the equipment that killed the British solders on Sunday, but it would be a matter of on-going investigation. Secondly, however, we had expressed and had not hidden in any way, our concern about Iranian activities, including in terms of equipment. Thirdly, however, were we in any way trying to duck the choice that we were facing Iran with? The answer was: no. What we were doing was making explicit so that people understood precisely that we were presenting a strategic choice to Iran. The PMOS said that this was not simply a matter of talking for talking’s sake, but rather, it was a matter of talking to make clear that people did have a choice. It was also to make it clear to people in the wider Middle East that our stance was based on giving Iran and Syria a choice, and it was for them to make that choice, not us.

Asked when they had until to make that choice, the PMOS replied that he was not going to put down artificial deadlines. People were judged by their actions. If people were presented with a choice, then judgements were made as they went along.

Asked what was the role that people envisaged in Iraq for Iran and Syria, and was it to do with calming things down, the PMOS said that it was a fact of life that Iran did have an influence on groups within Iraq. It was also a fact of life that there was a influence with Hezbollah and that Syria had a choice as to what its position vis a vis Lebanon. It therefore depended on how people exercised their choices in these various areas. It was not talking for talking’s sake, nor to make concessions unilaterally, but rather, it was talking to make people make a strategic choice.

Asked if there had been any further responses from Syria since Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s recent visit that made the Prime Minister any more optimistic about the choice that Hamas would make, and had there been any similar visits to Iran, the PMOS said that we did have the normal diplomatic relations with Iran, and therefore, we would talk along the normal diplomatic channels. In terms of Syria, we were still in the period of waiting to see what their response would be. What was important was that the responsibility was on Syria to make its choice, just as with Iran.

Put that Hamas and President Abbas were trying to form a government, and therefore, did we take that as a sign that if Hamas was trying to have a discussion, it meant that pressure from Syria was being lifted, the PMOS said that it was too premature to answer, but it was an interesting question. The PMOS said that he did not want to act as a commentator on Hamas. The PMOS reiterated what the Prime Minister had said when we were in Ramallah which was that we were prepared to talk to the Palestinian Government so long as it recognised the internationally accepted principles laid down by the Quartet. That willingness was there, and again, the responsibility was on the Palestinians to see whether they met that standard.

Asked what was the "or else" if Iran and Syria said no, the PMOS said that "or else" was that Syria and Iran remained outside the international pale, and the development of their countries would remain as they had been, hampered by that. People could play a constructive role or a negative one. In terms of their own interests, it seemed common sense that greater stability in the Middle East in the whole was just as much in their interests as everyone else’s.

Asked how far would they both have to go in order for us to decide that they had made the right choice, for example to stop sheltering terrorists, or give up nuclear weapons, the PMOS replied that in terms of Iran’s nuclear obligations, those were laid down by the UN. Again, it was not a matter of trading one for the other. What was clear was that Iran was in breach of its international obligations, and it needed to come into compliance with it.

Asked if that was a pre-requisite in the equation, the PMOS replied that he was not going to put down artificial criteria. However, the PMOS repeated what Iran’s international obligations were, which were for Iran to observe the obligations laid on it by the UN. That was not a matter on which we disagreed at all.

Asked if there was no question that if Iran admitted to playing a constructive role, there would be concessions on the nuclear issue, the PMOS replied that what we had said consistently was that we were not opposed to a genuinely civilian nuclear capability. What we were opposed to was something that potentially had the capacity to cross over into military and which breached the international obligations. This was not a matter of quid pro quo, but rather, it was of meeting international obligations.

Put that the PMOS had mentioned Syria in the context of Lebanon, and was that because Syria was now trying to stop the leakage of ammunitions to Iraq, the PMOS said that he was not going to give a commentary on Syrian co-operation. The pieces in the jigsaw all fitted together, so we did talk about the whole picture. The Prime Minister’s whole point today was that the Middle East issue had to be addressed as a whole, as this was not a matter of engaging the two countries just for the sake of engaging. It was as part of the overall approach to the Middle East.

Asked if there was any evidence that Iran and Syria were adopting a more constructive attitude, the PMOS replied that that was what we were trying to find out.

Put that there was none so far, the PMOS said again that that was what we were trying to find out. That was what was missing from the headlines this morning, and the fact that we were presenting people with a strategic choice.

Asked if we were prepared to accept and work with whomever the Iraqi Government wanted to work with, the PMOS said that was an international hypothetical question. We had no evidence that the Iraqi Government was in a different place from us on this, and we believed that equally, they wanted to build relations with their neighbours on the same basis, but it was a matter for them.

Put that there was no question that there would be Iranian or Syrian troops going into Iraq, the PMOS said that he had seen no suggestion of that whatsoever.

Asked if the Prime Minister saw the results of the US elections as an opportunity to push his agenda on the Middle East and to persuade President Bush to listen more, the PMOS firstly referred people to the Prime Minister’s LA speech and his approach to the wider Middle East issue. People could trace to there his analysis that we needed to push it forward, so this was not something that had suddenly come up following the mid-terms. Secondly, were there debates going on in America and elsewhere about Iraq policy? Answer: yes. Did the Prime Minister believe therefore that this was a time to be articulating his overall vision on the Middle East and Iraq policy within the context of that? Answer: yes.

Put that it seemed that all the cards were in Iran and Syria’s hands about what was happening in the Middle East, and asked how we were in a position to say there was a strategic choice and "do this or else", the PMOS replied that he disputed the journalist’s analysis of our approach, in that it was characterised by us asking for help. Rather, what we were doing was presenting the choices which faced everyone in the Middle East. Did you help build a democratic elective government in Iraq, which was truly representative? Did you help get a resolution of Israel and Palestine? Did you help get better stability across the region? There was a perception that in some way, that was not what we were trying to do, but it was right to say that that was what we were trying to do, and to argue the case for that with Iran and Syria. That was what we were doing.

Asked to clarify that the general view had been that there were lots of different options, one of which was greater engagement with Syria and Iran over Iraq, the PMOS said that if people went back to the LA speech, it was absolutely clear that that was what the Prime Minister’s view had always been.

Asked if we were therefore not moving forward at all diplomatically, the PMOS asked how the journalist could say that when we had sent Sir Nigel Sheinwald to Syria, and when we were going out of our way to make it clear the terms on which we were prepared to engage. That was important, but what it was not was how it was presented by some sources this morning.

Asked if the Americans were coming round to the Prime Minister’s point of view, the PMOS replied that he was not going to speak for the Americans, as it was unwise to do so whenever the Baker/Hamilton Committee were in the process of setting their position. The consistent message from the Prime Minister here was that if people looked at the wider Middle East, we needed to move forward as a whole. We needed to move forward in Iraq, Israel and Palestine, and in Lebanon. We also needed to move forward in knowing the basis in which we were going to deal with Iran and Syria. That was the basis on which the Prime Minister was talking, as it was part of his overall analysis of a wider Middle East.

Asked further about the strategic choice Syria and Iran had to make, the PMOS replied that it was precisely as the Prime Minister had set out in his speech in August. If people stopped supporting terrorism and trying to acquire nuclear weapons and breaching international obligations, then we were willing to have a partnership. That was the choice for Iran specifically, but the same choice was there for Syria as well, and that was the message which we conveyed in Damascus recently.

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» Monday, November 13, 2006

Prime Minister’s Speech

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