Downing Street Says » Butler Report

Asked if there had been any discussion at Cabinet this morning about collective Government, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said no. Asked if the Butler Report had been discussed at all, the PMOS said no. He pointed out that one of the criticisms contained in the Report, which the media had picked up on, was the fact that some Cabinet discussions had not been prepared for properly. In the light of the fact that the Report had only been published yesterday, it was therefore entirely understandable why there had been no discussion about it at Cabinet today. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that there were obviously implications arising from the Butler Report which we would reflect on. That would be done in a considered, rather than knee-jerk, fashion. In our view, that was the most sensible way to approach these issues.

Asked to explain why the caveats, which should have been attached to some of the intelligence presented in the dossier, had been removed, the PMOS said that we had accepted Lord Butler’s points about this issue, as the Prime Minister himself had stated yesterday. We were not going to get drawn into a discussion about something that had already been dealt with. We accepted Lord Butler’s recommendations, just as we accepted the recommendations of the Hutton Report, the ISC Report and FAC Report which had all covered similar ground.

Asked why the public should believe that John Scarlett was the best person to implement Lord Butler’s recommendations to improve the workings of the SIS, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had pointed out in his Statement to the House yesterday afternoon, the current head of the SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, had said that the SIS accepted the recommendations and would implement the necessary changes. In terms of Mr Scarlett, the Butler Committee – and indeed Lord Butler himself – had explicitly gone out of their way to say that they believed he was the best person for the job and that he should take up his post as the next Chief of MI6. Asked why they believed that was the case, the PMOS pointed out that an independent selection panel, chaired by Sir David Omand, had decided that he was the best candidate. It was not for us to comment on what was essentially a personnel matter. Asked if extra money would help the security services ensure that the same mistakes were not made in the future, the PMOS pointed out that the CSR announcement this week showed that the resources going into the security services had nearly doubled since 1997. This was because of the nature of the threat we were facing worldwide and the fact that more security service staff were needed.

Asked to explain why the Prime Minister had told the Commons on 24 September 2002 that the intelligence picture was “extensive, detailed and authoritative” when the JIC had acknowledged earlier in the year that intelligence was “patchy” and “limited”, the PMOS said that the Butler Report had dealt with these issues and had concluded that the Prime Minister’s Statements had been made in good faith. We acknowledged that mistakes had been made, but as the Report also pointed out, “the dossier reflected fairly the judgements of past JIC assessments” (Paragraph 333). Asked again why the caveats had been removed from the dossier, the PMOS said that he had no intention of going over the same ground that Lord Butler had gone over yesterday. Lord Butler was clearly the authoritative voice on this matter, as Lord Hutton had been before him. Put to him that Lord Butler had observed that intelligence was unable to explain people’s motives and that therefore it was up to Downing Street to explain why the Prime Minister had acted in the way he had, the PMOS said that Lord Butler had carried out his investigations in great detail and had concluded that nothing improper had happened. Questioned as to why, if the Prime Minister had been acting in good faith, the caveats had been removed, the PMOS said that it had been part of the process of producing the dossier, which the JIC had overseen.

Asked if the Prime Minister believed that one of the main issues at stake was the judgements which had been taken about what material to include in the dossier and how it should be presented, given the view he had stated in the past that the real issue was about judgements in general, the PMOS said we had accepted that, in retrospect, it would have been better for the caveats to have been included in the dossier. However, in terms of judgements, the Prime Minister continued to stand absolutely by the judgement to go to war. As the Report had concluded, the underlying intelligence regarding the threat from Iraq in terms of strategic intent, illicit research and development, illicit ballistic missile development and procurement had been found to be correct. Therefore, just as the Report had set out both sides of the case, perhaps the media should follow that example and come to a balanced judgement, rather than focussing only on the criticisms of the Butler Committee.

Asked if the Prime Minister had resolved not to publish any further dossiers under JIC ownership in the future, the PMOS said that he had no intention of getting drawn into a discussion about hypothetical scenarios. That said, we accepted the Butler Report’s recommendation that there should be a “clear delineation” in the future between the Government and JIC.

Asked if the Prime Minister had spoken to Sir Richard Dearlove about John Scarlett, the PMOS said that it wasn’t our policy to give a running commentary on private conversations between the Prime Minister and those who served the Government.

Asked for a reaction to Robin Cook’s view that there ought to be a return to Cabinet Government, the PMOS said that as the Deputy Prime Minister had pointed out this morning, Cabinet had discussed Iraq twenty four times over the course of the year running up to the war. Moreover, the fact that two members of the Cabinet had left the Government after those debates suggested that there had been lively discussion. The PMOS pointed out that Cabinet Government did not only relate to foreign issues. The domestic agenda was just as important. Today, for example, Cabinet had discussed the Home Office’s five-year plan, due to be published next week, just as in recent weeks they had discussed education and health. Clearly, Cabinet Government was alive and well. Asked if he was indicating that claims that Cabinet papers had not been circulated had referred only to those relating to the Iraq war, the PMOS said that he would disagree with the premise of the question. He underlined again that we would look at all of Lord Butler’s recommendations and reflect on them very carefully, as you would expect.

Asked to explain how the Prime Minister had come to write in his foreword to the dossier that he was “in no doubt the threat was serious and current” when the JIC had said on 9 September 2002 that any pre-emptive strike by Saddam with WMD “was unlikely”, the PMOS said that as Lord Butler had made clear in his report, there was “no evidence of deliberate distortion” (Chapter 8, paragraph 21). Asked if the Prime Minister regretted making such confident assertions in his foreword, the PMOS referred journalists to the Prime Minister’s Statement to the House yesterday in which he had accepted responsibility for mistakes which had been made. Equally, it was important not to ignore other statements he had made. For example, in September 2002, he had said, ” I cannot say when a threat will materialise. I can’t say whether it will be next month, in six months’ time or in a year’s time”. He had also set out the context in March 2003 when he had explained why he believed the threat to be different post September 11, and why, as he had said yesterday, the “calculus” of the threat had changed.

Asked to explain precisely what the Prime Minister had accepted responsibility for, the PMOS said that he had accepted responsibility for the mistakes which had been made. He had also accepted responsibility for the overall judgement of going to war. As he had told the House yesterday, if he had known then what he knew now, he would still believe it had been right to go to war because the calculus of the threat had changed. Asked if the Prime Minister accepted responsibility for the removal of the caveats from the dossier, the PMOS repeated that the Prime Minister accepted responsibility for the mistakes which had been made. We had also made clear that it would have been better to have included the caveats in the dossier.

Asked what action would be taken now that the Prime Minister had accepted responsibility for the mistakes which had been made, the PMOS said that we would do all we could to ensure that those mistakes were not repeated in the future. Asked if the Prime Minister would apologise, the PMOS pointed out that four inquiries had now concluded that the Prime Minister had acted in good faith, not in bad faith. That was an important distinction to make. Put to him that the Prime Minister could still issue an apology even though he had acted in good faith, the PMOS said that a judgement had been made that it had been right to go to war and that the case to support it had been correct. As paragraph 41 of Lord Butler’s conclusions showed, there had still been strategic intent on the part of Saddam to develop WMD once the sanctions against Iraq had been eroded or the pressure had been lifted from the UN. Consequently, the Prime Minister believed that the central reason for going to war remained as valid today as it had been then. Asked why the Prime Minister was refusing to apologise for ‘significant’ mistakes when Downing Street had insisted on an apology from Andrew Gilligan for making one mistake in an early morning broadcast, the PMOS said that the primary reason why we had wanted the position rectified last year was because Downing Street had been accused of acting in bad faith. Four inquiries had found that that accusation was unjustified, which was an endorsement of our view from the outset that the Prime Minister, the Government, officials and the security services had all acted in good faith. Put to him that heads had rolled at the BBC for the structural weaknesses in its working practices which had been exposed by Lord Hutton and that the same thing should take place in Downing Street which had also been criticised for similar failings, the PMOS said that we had set up an inquiry when a discrepancy in the intelligence before and after the war had became apparent. That inquiry had investigated the facts and the inquiry’s conclusions had been published yesterday. We had said that we would act on those findings. That said, it was important to recognise that Lord Butler had identified a picture of collective responsibility, not individual instances of bad faith. That had also been the conclusion of Lord Hutton, the FAC and the ISC. Asked if he was indicating that the Prime Minister had searched his conscience and had decided that there was nothing whatsoever that he should be apologising for, the PMOS said that we had made no attempt to minimise the fact that mistakes had been made, to acknowledge that mistakes had been made and to accept responsibility for mistakes which had been made. However, no inquiry had found that the Prime Minister or the Government had acted in bad faith. That was an important distinction to make.

Asked if the Prime Minister’s position was setting a good example to the country of what taking responsibility for mistakes should actually mean, the PMOS said that no one took the loss of military and civilian life in Iraq more seriously than the Prime Minister. Equally, however, he continued to believe that the central reasons he had put forward for going to war remained as valid today as they had been at the time. Our belief that Saddam had been a threat had been validated by Lord Butler’s report, which had found that the Prime Minister had acted in good faith.

3 Comments »

You can be stupid in good faith. You can be ignorant in good faith. You can make mistakes in good faith. You can do a lot of things in good faith.

Psychotic mad men may kill people who they believe are agents of the Devil. They are acting in good faith but we still send them to prison.

In wanting Tony Blair charged as a war criminal I’m not questioning his good faith but if he committed the crimes then he should pay.
Comment by Uncarved Block — 15 Jul 2004 on 10:34 pm | Link
The thing that really gets up my nose is that Bliar keeps insisting that 4 enquiries have cleared him of any wrongdoing. As we all know, NONE of them have actually cleared him because they haven’t been properly allowed to investigate his obvious interference.

Having said that, even if one of those 4 enquiries WAS allowed to investigate the political misuse of intelligence, the cronies and establishment flunkies staffing those enquiries would no doubt have conveniently overlooked the crucial questions – and because the questions aren’t asked, no answers are volunteered. Just another example of the self-serving, weasly attitude of politicians. Makes my blood boil!
Comment by PapaLazzzaru — 16 Jul 2004 on 8:47 am | Link
I like that trick where before the report it’s: "I’m sorry I won’t answer questions that will be dealt in the report."

And after the report it’s: "I refuse to be drawn on matters that have already been decided in the report."

He thinks we’re pretty stupid, does he not?
Comment by Julian Todd — 17 Jul 2004 on 1:18 am | Link

RSS feed for comments on this post.

Post a public comment

Name (required)
E-mail (required)
(You must give an email address, but it will not be displayed to the public.)
Website
(You may give your website, and it will be displayed to the public.)

Comments:

This is not a way of contacting the Prime Minister. If you would like to contact the Prime Minister, go to the 10 Downing Street official site.

Privacy note: Shortly after posting, your name and comment will be displayed on the site. This means that people searching for your name on the Internet will be able to find and read your comment.

Original PMOS briefings are © Crown Copyright. Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. Click-use licence number C02W0004089. Material is reproduced from the original 10 Downing Street source, but may not be the most up-to-date version of the briefings, which might be revised at the original source. Users should check with the original source in case of revisions. Comments are © Copyright contributors. Everything else is © Copyright Downing Street Says.

» Thursday, July 15, 2004

Butler Report

3 Comments »

Post a public comment

Search

Supported by

Recent Briefings

Archives

Links

Syndicate (RSS/XML)

Credits

Enquiries