» Monday, May 24, 2004Iraq
Asked when an announcement on troop deployments would be made, the PMOS said that an announcement would be made at the appropriate time. A decision would be taken against the strategic background that we were currently seeing being played out, for instance at the UN today, when we were anticipating the draft Security Council Resolution to be tabled. Asked to explain the phrase ‘strategic background’, the PMOS said that as he had told journalists last week, we were now pursuing a two-track strategy as the pace towards which we were approaching 30 June gathered momentum. Firstly, on security, we wanted to see the stabilisation of the security situation in Iraq, despite the current background of difficulties which, as we had already acknowledged, were likely to get more challenging as we approached 30 June. Secondly, on the political track, a number of developments were being made – the first being the Security Council Resolution, a draft of which we believed would be tabled today at the UN; the second being the work of Lakhdar Brahimi in selecting the Interim Authority. We were clearly going to see progress on both fronts over the coming days and weeks. Asked when the draft UN Resolution might be approved and whether such an achievement would mark a climate in which a decision on troop deployments could be made, the PMOS pointed out that the decision on troops would also have to take into account the military’s assessment of the situation on the ground. No decision on this issue had been taken at this stage. The new UN Resolution would help highlight the fact that we were entering a new phase in which a post-30 June Iraq would see the transfer of full sovereignty. A Resolution would also endorse the formation of an interim, sovereign, independent government as well as the timetable to hold elections by 31 January 2005. It would also set out the leading role that the UN would play in assisting the people of Iraq in forming their own institutions. For all these reasons, the draft Resolution was clearly an important document. Asked when the Resolution might be agreed, the PMOS said that it would be debated at the UN in New York. As everyone was well aware, events at the UN tended to take on a momentum of their own. In the meantime, we were continuing to work towards the 30 June deadline. Asked for an update on the direct talks we had been having with Washington on the key issues ahead of 30 June and how they related to the adoption of the draft Resolution, the PMOS said that both we and the US had obviously been closely involved in the preparation of the draft Resolution. That was why it reflected a UK/US consensus on the way forward. However, as we had been indicating over the past week, what we were now seeing was the beginning of the implementation of a joint strategy on the process of Iraqi-isation both in terms of the political and security tracks. Asked if agreement had been reached on such issues as the command of the Iraqi army and control over oil resources, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister could not have been any clearer in the House last Wednesday in saying that oil revenues would be disbursed by the Iraqi government. In terms of the control of the multi-national force post-30 June and the role of the Iraqi army, details were still being sorted out. However, the principle was clear: the Interim Authority, working together with the multi-national force, would set out the strategic framework within which the force would operate. Asked if the draft Resolution specified who would be in charge of the multi-national force, the PMOS said that British troops would continue to be commanded by British military commanders. However, the overall strategic framework within which they would work would be set out on the basis of a consensus so that the multi-national force would be able to work together in partnership with the Iraqi forces and the Interim Authority. Put to him that the UN should be sending troops to Iraq in the light of the fact that the UN would be voting on the Resolution, the PMOS said the UN had made it clear repeatedly that it did not have either the capacity or a desire to send troops to Iraq. In answer to further questions, the PMOS cautioned journalists against suggesting that the UK wanted a permanent larger presence in Iraq after June 30. After the transfer of sovereignty, the aim was to achieve Iraqi-isation as quickly as possible. However, that did not mean that we would cut and run. Nor did it mean that we would abandon an Iraqi security system which did not yet have the capacity to take the weight of countering the security threat. We had to strike the right balance. How that might be done was currently being considered and would of course be discussed with the Interim Authority once they were in office. Asked if the Draft Resolution would only be put to the vote after Mr Brahimi had finished his report, the PMOS said there was a logic which would suggest that Mr Brahimi would present his report at the end of this month, after which the draft Resolution would be put to a vote. However, these were matters which would be decided in New York, as was entirely appropriate. Asked if the Prime Minister and President Bush were planning to meet up in the near future, the PMOS said not as far as he was aware. Asked if it was possible for the decision on troop deployments to be made before the vote on the UN Resolution, the PMOS said that a decision on troops would be made at the appropriate time. He added that he understood the media’s impatience over the issue. However, it was important for journalists to understand that those concerned had to take time to consider all the factors involved and make any decision in a deliberative and measured way. Asked if the Prime Minister would use his monthly press conference tomorrow to explain his position on Iraq, in the same way that President Bush was outlining his position in a series of speeches, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister articulated his view of the way forward on a regular basis, and would continue to do so. No one under-estimated, or was complacent about, the difficulties on the security front in Iraq. However, it was important for everyone – the Iraqi people, the Coalition and the public at home – to recognise that we were following a coherent political and security strategy, the purpose of which was to achieve our original goal – a democratic, stable Iraq. Asked if the Prime Minister would use his press conference to underline the fact that, contrary to some perceptions, everything was not going wrong in Iraq, the PMOS said the Prime Minister was well aware that people had concerns in the light of recent events. That was perfectly natural. Equally, he believed that people appreciated what it was we were trying to do in Iraq and that we were developing a coherent plan with our Coalition partners to try to achieve that goal. The next few weeks would see an increase in momentum and showing people – both in Iraq and in the UK – that the plan was being implemented and would work. Asked if the strategic framework included a plan to expel the Coalition forces from Iraq, the PMOS said that as Colin Powell had underlined, if the Interim Authority indicated that they did not want us to remain in Iraq then of course we would have to abide by their decision, although we were not anticipating such a scenario to arise. We did not want to remain in Iraq any longer than we needed to be. However, we were determined to help the Iraqi people to increase the capacity of their security system – both in terms of quality as well as quantity – to deal with any threat. Asked if there was any significance in the fact that he had suddenly started using the term ‘strategic framework’, the PMOS said that he had been using the phrase since last Sunday to emphasise the fact that was happening was not a knee-jerk response to recent events on the ground. Rather it was a combined assessment of the need on the ground and our objective – namely, the Iraqi-isation of the security effort. Asked if an investigation had been launched into the leaking of the Foreign Office document at the weekend and what action would be taken against the individual responsible, the PMOS said that this was a matter for the Civil Service. He took the opportunity to issue a categorical denial that the document had been leaked deliberately, as seemed to be implied by some broadcasters this morning. Asked if we would expect the Interim Authority to grant UK forces immunity from prosecution, the PMOS said that after 30 June, our troops would operate in Iraq on the same basis that we operated in Afghanistan, Bosnia and other post-conflict situations. Briefing took place at 11:00 | Search for related news Original PMOS briefings are © Crown Copyright. Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. Click-use licence number C02W0004089. Material is reproduced from the original 10 Downing Street source, but may not be the most up-to-date version of the briefings, which might be revised at the original source. Users should check with the original source in case of revisions. Comments are © Copyright contributors. Everything else is © Copyright Downing Street Says. |
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Confused.
Comment by Roger Huffadine — 24 May 2004 on 3:20 pm | LinkThe use of the word ‘tabled’ in the USA means that the item for discussion has been ‘kicked into touch’ and will not be discussed. As we the originators of the English language know the word ‘tabled’ in English means put on the table for discussion.
I do wish that professional PR, media, Spokespeople would avoid using the word where the USA could be involved ,’cos it just causes confusion.