Downing Street Says

Asked if the deployment of additional British troops should be seen as part of an exit strategy from Iraq, the PMOS said that he had dealt with this issue at length yesterday, but he was happy to do so again. He pointed out that no decision had yet been made regarding further deployments. Moreover, as the Prime Minister had said yesterday, we had a clear strategy for our objectives in Iraq – namely, the creation of a stable democracy with the means to defend itself. That meant achieving a real transfer of authority on 1 July, leading to elections in January, but also creating the security apparatus which, in time, would be able to take full responsibility for Iraq’s security. It was within that context that any decision about troops would be made. It was a strategy which would allow us to achieve our objective: to give Iraqis both the authority and control over their own future.

Asked if the whole process had been speeded up, the PMOS said that we were in full throttle on both the diplomatic and the security tracks. We were pushing as fast as we could go to ensure that the transfer of sovereignty on 1 July was real and that the process of Iraqi-isation – of giving Iraqis responsibility for their own security – was consistent with maintaining the security level that was necessary to sustain the development of democracy. That meant that an awful lot of work was going on through diplomatic channels. It also meant that a lot of effort was being put into training the Iraqi security services. It went without saying that this was a process which would not happen overnight. Extra resources were being poured in and US General David Patraeus was being given a special role to speed things up by building on the British experience on the ground in Basra for example.

Asked if the decision on whether to deploy more troops would be based on our desire to speed up Iraqi-isation or the need to improve security in Iraq, the PMOS said that it was obviously important to continue to bear down on the insurgents and maintain a stable environment as much as possible. At the same time, however, we also wanted to train up Iraqis to take responsibility for their own security. Once that happened, the insurgents would no longer be able to claim that they were fighting against the Occupiers. In reality, they would be fighting against the security service serving the majority of Iraqi citizens.

Asked if the Prime Minister would agree with the Foreign Secretary’s assessment this morning that the level of insurgency made the implementation of the timetable more difficult and that it would therefore make sense to bring in extra troops as soon as possible to help crack down on the armed clerics who were organising the insurgency, thereby accelerating the timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq, the PMOS repeated that a decision on troop deployments had not yet been taken and he had no intention of pre-empting it. That said, he did not believe we were being presented with an either/or situation. It was important both to stabilise the security situation and also to build up the capacity of the Iraqi army, defence corps, police force and intelligence services so that they would be able to take on responsibility in these areas. Once that happened, it would be easier for ordinary Iraqis to identify with the security system in Iraq. This, we believed, would be part of the solution to some of the current difficulties. Asked if it was possible for responsibility to be handed over to the Iraqis in one sector prior to doing so in another, the PMOS said that there were already differentials in terms of the rate of progress being made in different areas run by the UK, US and others. This was not a dogmatic approach. It was an approach which built on the experience of each sector.

Asked to explain the difference between what we were doing now and what we would have been doing in any event in the run up to the transfer of sovereignty, the PMOS said that as we approached 30 June, the momentum was increasing all the time both in terms of the political and security tracks. We were in full throttle. In diplomatic terms, that meant that a lot of work was taking place within the Coalition as demonstrated by their meetings at the weekend, at the UN to achieve a new Security Council Resolution, and at Lakhdar Brahimi’s level to decide the structure of the Interim Authority and to hold a national conference at some stage to support his proposals. On the security side, discussions were ongoing to examine where we needed to increase capacity. In the past, we had focussed principally on the requirement for Iraqis to fill posts within the army and the police. Now we needed to focus on raising the level of quality to ensure that the Iraqis security services were able to deal with any threats they might face in the future.

Asked to explain how the structure of the Interim Authority would work, the PMOS said that Lakhdar Brahimi was in the lead on the issue and it would therefore be wrong to pre-empt his report, which we were expecting at the end of this month. However, it was fair to say that he would aim as much as possible for a structure representing the diverse elements in Iraq. Questioned as to whether the Iraqi Governing Council had fully accepted Mr Brahimi’s proposal, the PMOS pointed out that Mr Brahimi had yet to present his report. That said, the Prime Minister clearly respected the role the IGC had played, the bravery of which had been underlined by yesterday’s tragic events. As he had emphasised after the attack, the only outcome of such events was that it deepened our resolve to get the job done.

Asked when the Prime Minister had last spoken to President Bush and how often they were in contact with each other, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister and President spoke at least once a week – sometimes more often, as had been the case last week. Their last conversation had been at the weekend.

Asked if the Prime Minister shared the Foreign Secretary’s view that agreement on the European Constitution might not be secured in June, the PMOS said that he had heard Mr Straw’s interview on the Today Programme this morning and had interpreted his comments differently. The Foreign Secretary had simply been acknowledging that agreement was not inevitable, but that he still hoped it could be achieved. We were in a negotiation. That meant that opinions and judgements tended to change on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. What was important was that people were aware of the clarity of our position. We would have to wait and see what happened as the negotiations process progressed. Pressed as to whether the Prime Minister shared Mr Straw’s pessimism about securing an agreement, the PMOS said that the Foreign Secretary had simply been underlining the point that any eventual agreement would need to respect our position. We would have to wait and see how the things panned out. Only then would we be able to make a decision – the criteria of which had been set out very clearly.

Asked for a reaction to Joschka Fisher’s accusation that the UK was using ‘salami tactics’ during the current negotiations on the EU Constitution, the PMOS said that it wasn’t his job to comment on the views expressed by other Foreign Ministers. Suffice to say that we were clearly in the middle of a real negotiation. Asked if there was a feeling that our red lines were suddenly under threat again after having been assured that they were safe, the PMOS said that we were seeking clarity on the red lines we had set out. Asked if he was indicating that there was some doubt about the assurances we had received on our red lines, the PMOS said that we hadn’t increased the number of our red lines. Nor were we hardening our position. The point was that this was a real negotiation in which we wanted to see our position fully reflected.

Asked if the Charter of Fundamental Rights having no legal force was a red line area for us, the PMOS said we believed that we had made good progress on the Charter. However, we also believed that we needed a further technical amendment to give us the legal certainty we needed. We were seeking clarity.

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» Tuesday, May 18, 2004

Iraq

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