Downing Street Says

Asked if the Prime Minister was going to the United Nations next week the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) told journalists that he had nothing further to add to yesterday’s answer but it was important to bear in mind that we were still awaiting the report by Lakhdar Brahimi, due at the end of the month, which would set out the next stage of developments in Iraq. The PMOS reiterated that even though events were picking up momentum as 30 June approached it was still important to take the process step by step.

Asked if there was a difference between the Government and Colin Powell over who would command troops after 30 June, the PMOS responded that there absolutely was not. It was important to be clear about what the draft UN Resolution said and there were two key words. One was “consent” and the other was “co-ordination”. As Colin Powell had himself said 10 days ago if the Iraqi Interim Government wanted the multi-national force to leave, then it would leave, that was what consent meant. President Bush had underlined that full sovereignty meant full sovereignty as the PM had reflected yesterday. The Prime Minister had also reflected that there was a two level split over command: one was at the strategic level and the other the operational level. That split was a division that we in this country were very familiar with. It was a division that had operated in Northern Ireland for 30 years for example and in other areas where coalitions had worked as partners such as Bosnia, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. The division was clear. If you were at the wrong end of a rocket-propelled grenade now you didn’t have to phone a committee to ask how to respond. After 30 June whether you were British, American, Iraqi, Dutch or any other coalition member for that matter this would still be true. Operational control would remain at the level of local decision making. US commanders would be in control of US troops. British commanders would remain in charge of British troops and Iraqi commanders would be in charge of Iraqi troops. What would change, as President Bush had said, was that after 30 June the CPA would disappear and not be replaced, instead there would be the Iraqi Interim Government. It would have a mechanism such as a national security committee that would agree and coordinate with the multinational force the broad strategic approach to security. It would decide the profile and balance of forces in particular areas. The change after 30 June would be that the Iraqi Interim Government would work in close coordination with the multinational force to decide these strategic issues.

Questioned as to how the attack on Falluja would be have been classified, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had made his view absolutely clear in his press conference yesterday that it was a strategic decision. However once an operation began then the operational control was at the level of the local commander. The PMOS again drew attention to the wording in the resolution that recognised the importance of the consent of the sovereign government for the presence of the multinational force and the close coordination of the multinational force and the Interim Government. It was true that there were still technical arrangements that would have to be made, but that was true of any operation. What the resolution could not do was set out in black and white the precise arrangements for every eventuality and it was totally unrealistic to expect it to do so. What it did do however was set out very clearly the principles by which everyone would operate: consent by the Iraqi Government, and coordination between it and the multinational force.

Asked about the composition of the national security committee mechanism the PMOS said that the precise make up of the mechanism was still being finalised and therefore yet to be decided. It would also have to be agreed by the incoming Interim Government, but what we may have was an Iraqi National Security Council that met with and coordinated security with the multinational force. If the Iraqis did not want a particular operation then, as the Prime Minister had said yesterday, they could of course say no. Equally however the Iraqis could not ask the multinational force to carry out an operation it did not believe to be right or believed too dangerous, it worked both ways. Asked if the veto applied to US troops the PMOS pointed out that that was the position for the multinational force. In response to further questioning the PMOS suggested that people needed to get away from the idea that the multinational force would have a different agenda from the Iraqi Interim Government. They would be precisely the same, namely stability and to increase the capacity of Iraqi security forces to take on responsibility as quickly as possible. The two sides shared the same goals and would therefore work out the best way of achieving those goals. Practical issues would come up and be debated and discussed, but practical issues would be resolved through practical arrangements rather than trying to find some ideological divide which was not there. The aim was to build on our experience and form the strongest ever level of cooperation between a sovereign Iraqi government and a coalition force, but as Colin Powell said we would only stay as long the Iraqis wanted us to. There would always be practical issues but the principles of consent and coordination were there in black and white in the UN resolution.

In response to the suggestion that this had still not reconciled Colin Powell’s comments yesterday on Iraqi sovereignty and US troops with the Prime Minister’s the PMOS read out what Colin Powell had said, “They are sovereign. We are there at their consent, with their consent.” Colin Powell had further said, “U.S. forces remain under U.S. command and will do what is necessary to protect themselves.” The PMOS reiterated our agreement with this point that if an agreed operation was started then of course you finished that operation. Operational control meant operational control and that was a concept everyone was deeply familiar with in this country and there was no disagreement with that. The key question was the strategic decisions about the balance of forces, the kinds of operation taken, the profiles, the balance between the growing capacity of the Iraqis and the role of the multinational force.

Asked whether more British troops would not be sent till after 10 June the PMOS reminded journalists that a decision would be taken whenever the various elements involved had been taken into account and not based on any artificial deadlines.

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» Wednesday, May 26, 2004

Iraq

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