Downing Street Says

Asked if Downing Street agreed with view of the German Ambassador to the UN who had reportedly said that the draft Security Council Resolution did not give Coalition forces the mandate to remain in Iraq for more than a year after the transfer of sovereignty, the PMOS said that the Resolution had not yet been circulated in New York and he was therefore unable to comment in detail on the text. That said, as Colin Powell and others had pointed out, the key issue was the fact that it would be the Interim Government which would give its consent to the continuing presence of the Coalition in Iraq. The principal point, therefore, was not the existence of some arbitrary deadline, but whether we were achieving the goal we had set out to achieve, namely the progressive Iraqi-isation of the security and political processes with the aim of working towards free elections.

Asked what President Bush would say about Iraq in his speech this evening, the PMOS said that he wasn’t the President’s spokesman. That said, as we had been underlining for the last ten days or so, we were developing a consensus on the way forward in Iraq. This was a joint Coalition approach focussing on the future political and security tracks after 30 June, firstly in terms of the appointment of an Interim Government and secondly in terms of a national conference and elections by the end of January 2005. Asked if President Bush would confirm a proposal, as outlined in the leaked FCO memo at the weekend, to establish an ‘Iraqi National Security Council’ comprising representatives from a multi-national force and the Iraqi Government, the PMOS repeated that he wasn’t a spokesman for the President. Nor had he any intention of commenting on leaked documents. All he would say was that it was important for there to be a mechanism for reaching a consensus and establishing a partnership between the Iraqi Interim Government and the multi-national force after 30 June to set the strategic framework within which the multi-national force could work in partnership with Iraqi forces. Asked if he would recognise the phrase ‘Iraqi National Security Council’, the PMOS said that all he would say about it was that it was ‘familiar’, although he was unsure whether that was what the body would finally be called.

Asked if the Prime Minister had spoken to the President in the last forty-eight hours, the PMOS said that Downing Street was in regular contact with the US Administration, as you would expect. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister would go to the UN at any point to push the case for a new Resolution, the PMOS said that if he was being asked about today’s Evening Standard report, he would merely point out that the story had painted a scenario which he did not recognise.

Asked if ordinary Iraqis would be aware of any difference to their country come 1 July, the PMOS said yes because they would be able to see the fact that they were being governed by Iraqis who would clearly be holding the mantle of sovereignty and authority. They would also be able to see a gradual transfer of responsibility for security to Iraqi forces as and when the Iraqi forces had the capacity to be able to take it on. If he was being asked if there would be an instant transformation of the situation, the answer was no, of course not. However, there would be a visible difference in how Iraq was governed and in the way in which the security profile altered over a relatively short period of time. Asked to explain the term ‘security profile’, the PMOS said that we would need to look primarily at the overall situation and discuss the framework within which the Interim Government and the multi-national force could operate. The precise detail and arrangements were still being discussed. They would only be resolved once the Interim Government was named and began to meet regularly.

Asked how confident the Prime Minister was about reaching an agreement on the new UN Resolution and whether it mattered if it didn’t happen, the PMOS said the Prime Minister believed fervently that a UN Resolution was in the interests of Iraq – a view he hoped was shared by the UN as a whole, not least because it would validate and endorse the incoming Interim Government and give recognition to the fact that authority was passing to the Iraqi people themselves.

Asked to explain the difference between Coalition forces and a multi-national force, the PMOS said that Coalition forces would become known as the multi-national force after 30 June. Asked if the Americans would continue to lead it, the PMOS said that it would comprise the balance of forces which were in Iraq at the moment. The difference was that it would only work with the consent of the Iraqi Interim Government.

Asked why it was taking so long to reach a decision on the deployment of more troops to Iraq, the PMOS said the reality of the situation was more complicated than people might appreciate. There were multiple factors which needed to be considered. As we had been underlining consistently over the past few days, what was going on at the moment was not a knee-jerk response to recent events in Iraq. It was a strategic response. Consequently, it was necessary to combine the need on the ground with a strategic overview, namely to achieve the Iraqi-isation of the security effort. This was clearly a complicated process, which was why we were determined that our military advisers would be given as much time as they needed to put together what they believed to be the right options for the Prime Minister to consider. Questioned as to whether we would have to wait for the Interim Government to invite more British troops into Iraq if it was decided they were needed if they were not deployed before 30 June, the PMOS said that as Colin Powell had been the first to point out around ten days ago, the fact of the matter was that if the Interim Government asked the multi-national force to leave Iraq, we would have to do so. Consequently, there was no possibility that we would seek to insert forces against the wishes of the Iraqi Government. Our objective was to speed up the transfer of responsibility for security to the Iraqi as quickly as possible. However, that could only happen at the speed at which the Iraqis were capable of taking it over. To do so faster than they were able to cope with would be irresponsible. After June 30 we would only be operating with the consent of the Iraqis. Rather than posing some sort of threat or unwelcome hindrance to our efforts, it was actually a core part of them. Asked to explain how the transfer of responsibility for security was being speeded up, the PMOS said that as he had told journalists last week, we were speeding up the process of training Iraqi forces, building relationships with them and applying the lessons learned from such a successful policy in and around Basra and in some US zones. Asked if there was an end-date for this transfer of responsibility, the PMOS said that it would take as long as it takes. The job would be completed once the Iraqi forces had the capacity to defend their country against whatever threats it faced.

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» Monday, May 24, 2004

Iraq

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