Downing Street Says

Asked for further insight into the Cabinet’s discussion on Iraq, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that it was led by the Prime Minister, Margaret Beckett and Des Browne. As the Prime Minister had set out yesterday in the Commons, the starting point was to recognise the situations in Baghdad and Basra were very different. 80-90% of the violence in Iraq was in or around the Baghdad area. The situation in Basra, whilst not perfect, and partly as a result of Operation Sinbad, had improved considerably. The underlying symmetry in our approach, and in the new US approach was that what the UK, the US and most importantly, the Iraqis’ strategy was about was to create the time and the space for the Iraqi Government to establish its authority, both in terms of security, but also in terms of the building the Iraqi economy. That meant a strategy of clearing areas of terrorists, holding them, and then building through reconstruction. That clear "hold and build" strategy was what we had been doing in Operation Sinbad since November, and that was going well. As the PMOS had said yesterday, what happened in the future would all depend on what happened on the ground in Basra.

Asked how much longer did Operation Sinbad need to complete its task, the PMOS replied that we had said that it would last until February, but the PMOS said he could not be precise, as it would depend on the conditions on the ground. The important thing to emphasise was that the Iraqi 10th Division was in the lead role now in terms of the security aspects of Operation Sinbad. The PMOS said that that was also a sign of the progress that we were making.

Asked if with regards to timings, might that not make people think that there was a "whiff of truth" about the Daily Telegraph story today, the PMOS replied: no. In terms of our overall strategy since April 2004, it had been Iraqiisation. It had been to build up Iraqi capacity to the point where the Iraqis themselves could take control. We were not yet at the point where that process was complete, but we were making progress. It was exactly the same underlying strategy which was behind what the US plan was. Therefore, what was important was that we judged our success in terms of how far we got in building the Iraqi capacity, and that was not just in security terms, but also in economic terms. That was why the infrastructure part of the programme was as important as the military one. It was a twin-tracked strategy.

Asked if that meant that the 2 strategies of the US and the UK had been closely co-ordinated over the past few weeks by the Prime Minister and the President, the PMOS replied that we had always co-ordinated our strategy very closely with both the US and other coalition partners, as well as the Iraqi Government. It was because of the difference between Basra and Baghdad that the Iraqi Government supported us in what we were doing, and indeed had asked us to do more in terms of supporting the process of transferring to the Iraqi Government in Basra. We worked hand-in-glove with our coalition partners and the Iraqi Government.

Asked if there was any fear that the new battle for Baghdad which was about to begin would have any effect on the violence in the south, and was it still the expectation that we would hand over Maysan province, the PMOS replied that in terms of what happened in Baghdad, most observers believed that these militias tended to be more locally based, and therefore, it would be in Baghdad itself that the main conflicts with them would take place. However, we would continue to watch the situation, and the important point was that what happened in Basra would be based on the conditions in Basra as they evolved. Operation Sinbad had led to improvements, but we needed to see them continue. In terms of timetables, the best thing would be to talk about it whenever we had reached the situation where decisions could be made. Those decisions would be made based on the conditions on the ground.

Asked for the Prime Minister’s formal response to the announcement made by President Bush and also, was the Daily Telegraph’s story right or wrong, the PMOS said that in terms of our continuing influence in terms of Iraq, people should look at what we were doing in Operation Sinbad, as well as the support that we had received for the conception and the execution of Operation Sinbad from the Iraqi Government. People should also look at the way in which the Iraqi forces were working hand-in-glove with us in Basra and finally, the continuing diplomatic, military and political links that we had with the US Administration over Iraq.

Put that people could read from the PMOS’ answer that we were saying that everything was on-track, but the journalist said that he could infer that there was a strong "non-denial confirmation", the PMOS said no, because that ignored the number of times the PMOS and others had said this week that it was conditions based. Our assessment would come at the end of Operation Sinbad, and the Prime Minister had said that in the House yesterday. He said that that assessment would be based on the conditions on the ground then. What people should not do was project forward and say come what may, a certain plan of action would be carried out, as it all depended on what the actual situation was. The middle of an operation was not the time to make that assessment. That was why the Prime Minister had said that he would go back to the House and make a statement once he had assessed the outcome of Operation Sinbad, and that process of assessment would take as long as necessary.

Asked if therefore, there would not be a Prime Ministerial statement in the next few days, the PMOS replied that what the Prime Minister had said was that he would make a statement once we had assessed Operation Sinbad. It would run into February and there would then follow a period of assessment. Again, the length of that period of assessment would depend on the circumstances on the ground. The PMOS said that people had to deal with reality, rather than allowing stories in the Daily Telegraph to dictate agendas.

Asked for further clarification about the Cabinet discussion about building, the PMOS said that we now had a situation where in Basra province, we assessed that police effectiveness was at 69% of the capability standard. In Basra itself, the figure was just over 50%. People were aware of the operation that our forces carried out against the "Serious Crimes" building in Basra. We had refurbished 176 schools, 3 hospitals, 8 health clinics. We had also repaired roads and bridges, as well as a major clean-up operation in the areas where we had cleared. Therefore, the whole emphasis was to show that there could be areas that were free of terrorism and also, that the emphasis was just as much on reconstruction as it was on security.

Asked what did the Prime Minister think about President Bush’s new plan, as there had been some criticisms that the President had not used some of the recommendations from the Baker Report, the PMOS said that what the Baker Report had called for was an emphasis on helping Iraqi capability, and the President had said that. What the Report also called for was an emphasis on reconstruction, and what President Bush had announced would double the amount of US provincial reconstruction teams, and it would appoint a new US reconstruction co-ordinator. The President had also said that Dr Rice would go to the Middle East, and as the Prime Minister had said when we were last in Washington, Dr. Rice was involved very heavily behind the scenes in terms of trying to push forward the Middle East process. We welcomed all of that.

Asked if the Prime Minister thought that the President was correct in failing to respond to the Baker recommendation that they engaged with Syria and Iran, the PMS replied that the Prime Minister’s had expressed his own view on Syria and Iran whilst standing alongside President Bush at the White House. The Prime Minister’s view was that Iran and Syria did have a door which they could choose to enter or not. They had to make that choice. As the Prime Minister had said at Cabinet this morning, what there could not be was a situation where for example, Syria might be willing to be more helpful on Iraq, whilst at the same time, tried to reserve to itself the right to undermine the democratic Government of Lebanon. That was not a situation that would be acceptable. Equally, Iran had been deeply unhelpful in terms of the fact that there had been some Iranian components found in explosive devices aimed at our troops in the south. If Iran said that it would only be prepared to help if we went easy on the nuclear front, then that was not something that we could envisage. So, the strategic choice was Iran and Syria’s, and it was for them to decide what their approach was going to be.

Asked if the Prime Minister would ever consider completely removing British troops from Iraq once the job was done in that part of the country, leaving the Americans in Baghdad, the PMOS replied that that was a hypothetical situation. What we would respond to was the situation on the ground. What we did have to recognise was that there was a much greater sectarian element in Baghdad than there was in Basra, and that affected the complexity of the problems. The PMOS said that we had all learnt through bitter experience not to project too far ahead, and to take things step by step, and therefore, that is what we will do, based on the conditions on the ground.

Asked if it would be right to characterise the view that the options that were available to the President meant that he had taken the right one to achieve his objective, the PMOS responded by saying that what the Prime Minister fully supported was the effort that the US had with this new plan, the efforts of the Iraqi Government, and our own efforts to create the space and time for the Iraqi Government to establish its authority and to make Iraqi a more prosperous country. Therefore, the strategy of clear "hold and build" was what lay behind all three approaches, and that was the strategic symmetry that we now had.

Asked if we supported that line, the PMOS said that we supported everything that supported holding and building.

Asked if there were any alarms expressed at Cabinet about the US’ plan and how might their plan affect the UK’s policy, the PMOS said that what everyone welcomed was a clear sense of direction, both about where we wanted to get to and of the necessary elements to get us to that point.

Asked if the Prime Minister had spoken to President Bush about the plan, the PMOS replied that he did not give a running commentary on the Prime Minister’s conversations, but as people knew, we were in weekly contact with the Administration.

Put that when the PMOS had listed the three points that the Prime Minister had welcomed, he had not listed the crucial element of increasing the number of troops, and did the Prime Minister support the tactic of sending more troops to Baghdad as part of the clear "hold and build "strategy, the PMOS replied that what we would not do, any more than what the Americans would not do with us, would be to act as a commentator on other countries’ decisions on troops. It was a matter for other countries, just as it was a matter for us to decide on our level of troops. With regards to the overall strategy, there was a shared strategy, and therefore, we welcomed their efforts to try and carry that strategy out.

Asked that with regards to the police effectiveness statistics, what were we hoping the figures would be when we left, the PMOS replied that in terms of transfer to Iraqi control, we were on target to achieve a 72% capability level required for provincial Iraqi control. What this was about was making sure that the police and the army were up to the necessary standard. The PMOS said that Basra was a lower figure because the Basra city problem was much worse than the Basra province problem.

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» Thursday, January 11, 2007

Iraq

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