Downing Street Says » Anti Terror Legislation

Asked "what the important thing" was, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said it was that we had legislation on the statute book that gave the security services and the police the powers and the certainty they needed to deal properly with the terrorist threat as they assessed it to be. That threat was real, and it did need to met. Therefore, what was important was that we gave the police and the security services those powers to deal with the few cases where there was intelligence about a threat, but there was not evidence. The PMOS said that had been the issue all the way through, and that still remained the issue.

Asked why that would be affected by a Sunset Clause, the PMOS replied because what it would do would be to introduce an element of uncertainty and to send a signal to terrorists that if they kept the pressure up, in a year’s time the legislation would not be there. Therefore, the important thing was that Parliament had the right and the opportunity to review and debate its operation, and that we did not send the signal that we were not serious about it.

Asked if there was a Sunset Clause, wouldthe Government seek to introduce fresh legislation to replace it, and also whether the signal of uncertainty was the Prime Minister’s impression of the Sunset Clause, or the impression of the security services and the police, the PMOS said that what the security services and the police had said was that they needed these powers. They had also said what they wanted was certainty. What they did not get involved with was Parliamentary procedure. The reason why we needed the certainty was because if we had to go back to "Go" in a year’s time, and start all over again, then not only did it send a signal to terrorists, but it also introduced an element of uncertainty about such legislation. If there was a review, however, it allowed the process to be refined as it went along.

Asked about the advice given by the security services and police, the PMOS said what the security services and police had said was that they not only wanted this legislation, but they also wanted certainty. It was uncertainty that sent out the wrong message to terrorists.

Put to the PMOS that there was an allegation today that the Prime Minister and his office had misrepresented the situation to imply that the security services and the police were actually opposed to a Sunset Clause quite specifically, the PMOS replied that what we had always talked about was the necessity to send a strong signal to terrorists, and also the advantages of certainty. It was certainty versus uncertainty that was the heart of the Sunset Clause issue. The details of Parliamentary procedure were not a matter for the security services and the police. However, expressing the need for these powers, and the desire for certainty in the application of the powers was a matter for the police and the security services.

Asked if the security services and the police had said "in so many words" that they wanted certainty about the legislation, the PMOS replied that what they wanted was to have the powers. What they did not want was the uncertainty of thinking the powers were about to disappear. If there was a situation in which potentially, the powers could disappear in a year’s time, then that did introduce an element of uncertainty. The PMOS said that if people thought that something was not being taken seriously, then that did affect the operation, and therefore the effect.

Asked again if the security services and the police had said anything about the matter, the PMOS said again that they did not get involved in Parliamentary matters. The PMOS said he was not getting into discussing in detail about the conversations, but it was right to summarise the views of the security services and police as being supportive of the legislation. The PMOS recommended people look at the comments made by the Chairman of the ACPO Committee on Terrorism, and what Sir Ian Blair had said recently on "Newsnight" which was that he believed the police could operate with these measures.

Asked if it was true that the security services and the police would feel "uneasy" using powers that were "obviously" going to lapse, the PMOS said the question was going into hypothetical territory, but the journalist’s summary of what might be the fear or concern of the impact that knowing that the powers would lapse was accurate. It was one that we were anxious to counter by giving a signal to terrorists and to the system that we were serious about this, and that we recognised that unfortunately, terrorism was not going to disappear within the next year. That was reality, and a year on from the Madrid bombing, it was a reality that we had to recognise. That was therefore why it was important that we sent a signal to both the system and to the terrorists that we were serious.

Asked if it was the case that the line about sending a signal was only adopted after the Prime Minister came out "very hard" against the Sunset Clause on Wednesday 2nd March, whereas in lobby the previous day, the journalist had been told when asked about a Sunset Clause, the answer had been that "the important thing was to get the substance", the PMOS said that there was no substance if there was a signal also sent that it would disappear in a year. The PMOS said the problem being faced was not going to disappear in a year, and the issues and the dilemma would not change. There fore the answer should not change.

Asked if it was accurate that the security services and the police had told the Prime Minister they required certainty that the laws would not go on after a year, the PMOS said the security services and the police did not get involved in Parliamentary procedure.

The PMOS was interrupted at this point by the journalist saying that was not what he had asked. The PMOS said he understood what was being implied, and he was not getting involved. What the security services and the police had said was that they needed this bill. If they therefore needed this bill, and the situation was one that would not change over the next year in terms of the threat, it would therefore be injurious to the fight against terrorism if this bill were to disappear in a year.

Put to him that that was No10’s interpretation, rather than the security services and the police’s one, the PMOS said it was not No10’s interpretation, and he referred people again to the Chairman of the ACPO’s comments recently. They welcomed this bill. They did not say that they welcomed this bill, but were quite happy for it to disappear in a year.

Asked if the security services and the police had said they were opposed to a Sunset Clause, the PMOS said that again, the security services and the police did not get involved in Parliamentary procedures.

Asked to clarify if we were more likely to suffer a terrorist attack if there was uncertainty in the system, the PMOS said the reality was that what terrorists worked on were any signs of weakness or vulnerability, or any sign that we were not serious about the fight against terrorism. The other reality was that if the system believed the powers were temporary, they were not going to have the stability with which they believed they could apply the powers. What we wanted to do was to reduce any degree of uncertainty within the system, and to send the strongest degree possible to terrorists.

Put to him that the debate had now gone on for 24 hours, and was the Prime Minister prepared to go for "as long as it took" for the bill to go on the statute books for Monday morning, the PMOS said it was perfectly legitimate in a democracy for people to air their concerns. It was also perfectly legitimate for people to debate a bill, and the Government had responded as it had in terms of judicial input. It had made significant changes to meet those concerns. The PMOS explained that the House of Commons had now considered the House of Lords’ amendments, the burden of proof and the Sunset Clause, and it had rejected them three times. The Prime Minister’s view was that what should now happen was that the will of the Elected Chamber should be allowed to follow through. That attitude was not going to change.

Put to him that since the head MI5, or the Chairman of the ACPO was a public figure, would it therefore not help if they came out publicly and said they needed the measures, the PMOS said the Chairman of the ACPO’s Committee on Terrorism comments were already on the record. In terms of MI5, conventions were understood.

Asked whether Lord Falconer was right or wrong when he had told the Lords that the security services and the police had not come out against a Sunset Clause, the PMOS replied that Lord Falconer was simply making the point that it was not the role of either the security services or the police to act as commentators on Parliamentary process. What was the role of the security services and the police was to provide advice on the nature of the very real threat of terrorism, and the powers that they believed were necessary, not just for next year, but for the long-term in meeting that threat. That was what both the Prime Minister and the Government had acted on.

Put to him that the Prime Minister had strong recommendations from the security services and the police that a Sunset Clause was not required, the PMOS said the Prime Minister was reflecting the desire of the security services and the police to have these powers, and to have certainty in using them. That was what was needed to meet the threat.

Put to the PMOS repeatedly that the Prime Minister had not received a strong recommendation from the security services and the police regarding the Sunset Clause, the PMOS explained that what the Prime Minister was saying was that there had been a strong recommendation that we needed these powers, and not just for one year. What we also needed was certainty about using these powers. If the powers were going to disappear within 8 or 12 months, and not be reviewed or the operations looked at, then that sent the wrong signal.

Asked to confirm that the powers were renewable by a vote in the House, and therefore there was no certainty that they would exist, the PMOS said there was a very big difference between a review, and starting a legislative programme from the start, and people should not pretend otherwise.

Asked if it came down to a vote in the Houses, the PMOS said it came down to a vote; it did not mean it went back to "Go". If there was a Sunset Clause, it went back to "Go".

Asked for an explanation about how the Sunset Clause would impact upon the mental process of a suicide bomber, the PMOS responded to laughter by saying he did not think a suicide bomber was very funny in any way. He explained that one did not start with the individual, and as people knew, the terrorists watched the media very carefully, watched for signals of vulnerability or weakness, and that they tried to "play" the media and international audience. That was unfortunately the reality we were in, given the era of 24 hour news, and an era where international terrorists knew no bounds in terms of nations or what they were prepared to do. If international terrorist organisations believed that a country was not serious about fighting terrorism, they would organise accordingly. If, however, they believed that they could continue to mount pressure on a country, through trying to influence the measures that were taken to fight terrorism, then it would do so. Therefore, the question was not about what was going through the mind of a suicide bomber, but rather, what was going through the minds of those who sent the suicide bomber to do their dastardly work.

Asked how sending signals would really make a difference, when the terrorists "did not really care" about the damage they caused, the PMOS said the unfortunate reality was what the terrorists looked for were pressure points. What should therefore be done was to try and deny terrorists any pressure point at all. That was the reality, and if legislation were to lapse, then a flank would be opened up.

Asked if there was any limit to the time the "Ping Pong" could go on for, the PMOS said that was a matter for the House of Lords to recognise the will of the Elected Chamber.
Asked if the Prime Minister had cancelled any plans this weekend because of the debate, the PMOS said that like many people, he might be around Westminster a bit more than he had anticipated!

Asked why the powers could not simply be renewed, the PMOS said the problem with that was if they were renewed, it was then open to a court to say one was in defiance of the supreme court of the land. The other problem was that the Part IV powers only allowed people to act against non-UK nationals, and the advice from the security services and the police was that we might need to use these powers against some UK nationals.

Asked again what the security services and the police had said to the Government, the PMOS said that the security services and the police had said they needed these powers. They wanted the ability to use these powers with the certainty that they were not going to disappear.

Asked if the Prime Minister was going to say any words to the nation regarding the debate, the PMOS said that it was the Secretary of State who led on such matters in the House, but the Prime Minister had expressed his view very clearly in the House.

Put to the PMOS that the view in Spain was they did not want to tighten their anti terror laws, as that would be giving in to terrorists, and what did the Prime Minister think about it, the PMOS said that what the Spanish people did was a matter for them, and it was their judgement. What we had to deal with was a matter of security for this country, and to protect the lives of people in this country. If the security services and the police said that powers were necessary to deal with these few cases where there was intelligence of a real threat, then the choice was quite simple: it was – either people’s lives were protected in this country, or they were not. The Prime Minister believed that whatever was necessary should be done to protect those lives. The dilemma was recognised, but also acted on what was the best judgment.

Asked if under the Review, could the House throw the Bill out, the PMOS said that if the House did not support the Bill, then it would fall.

1 Comment »

I find it strange that every government commentator -so far – has assumed that a ‘sunset’ clause works in favor of the terrorists.

With a ‘sunset’ clause we get an opportunity to make the legislation more bomb proof [pun intended] by re-drafting using 12 months of experience.

The danger at present is that one will be able to drive a coach and horses through badly drafted legislation.
Comment by Roger Huffadine — 11 Mar 2005 on 4:34 pm | Link

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» Friday, March 11, 2005

Anti Terror Legislation

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