Downing Street Says » Iraq Inquiry

Asked how it was possible to conduct a full and thorough inquiry into the Iraq war without apportioning blame, the Prime Minister s Spokesman (PMS) said that the purpose of the inquiry was to look at what lessons could be learnt from what happened. In order to do that the inquiry needed to be given a wide remit and the relevant people in charge of the inquiry needed to be independent, credible and expert in their field. It was also important that people who gave evidence did so in a way that was as open and candid as possible, and that evidence was drawn from military intelligence reports and information. That was why it had been decided that the evidence should be given in private.

Asked if the inquiry would criticise anybody, the PMS said that the purpose of the inquiry was to look at what lessons could be learnt, to examine all the issues thoroughly and to be completely independent of Government. The Committee of Inquiry could look at whatever issues they felt appropriate and they could comment as they saw fit. The intention was to learn lessons.

Asked repeatedly if the legality of the war would be looked at, the PMS said that the Committee was looking at the lessons to be learnt, which could cover a whole range of issues from the decision to go to war to what happened afterwards. It was for the Committee to consider what they thought needed to be looked at. This was about understanding what happened and what lessons could be learnt from what happened.

Asked about the membership of the Committee, the PMS said that the Chair of the Committee was Sir John Chilcott who was Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office for many years. He was best known as the person who conducted the Intercept Evidence Inquiry that reported last year, which was seen as credible, independent and had cross-party support. Based on Sir John Chilcott s experience as a senior public figure and as the conductor of an inquiry into a sensitive issue related to national security and that required cross-party support, it was decided that he should be the Chairman of the inquiry.

The other members were people such as Sir Lawrence Freedman, a well-known and distinguished military historian and Professor of War Studies at King s College, London who recently published the two-volume official history of the Falklands War; Sir Martin Gilbert, a well-known and distinguished historian on military matters amongst others; Sir Roderick Lyne who was a former senior diplomat, most recently British Ambassador to Russia, and Baroness Usha Prashar, a crossbench Member of the House of Lords, who was Chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission and served on the Joint Committee of Human Rights.

Asked repeatedly whether witnesses would be able to decline from giving evidence, the PMS said that we would expect those who were called to attend. The statement made clear that the Committee had the ability to call whoever they felt necessary.

Asked how the Committee would be able to report without apportioning blame if they found mistakes were made, the PMS said that they would be able to report however they saw fit; they were fully independent of the Government. We needed to keep this issue in context; as the Prime Minister had said, it was difficult to think of any previous inquiry that had been so wide in scope. There was no inquiry into Suez. The Falklands conflict had the Franks inquiry, but that only looked at the limited issue of the immediate run-up to the conflict, not at the aftermath. There was no inquiry following the first Gulf War, with the exception of the Scott Inquiry, which looked at one particular issue There was no inquiry into British military involvement in Yugoslavia. If you looked at all potential comparable conflicts, it was difficult to see any previous inquiry, which was more transparent, more wide-ranging, and more probing in looking at the lessons to be learnt.

Asked if the inquiry would look into the Hutton report, the PMS said that it would look at whatever it was appropriate to look at in order to ensure that the appropriate lessons were learnt.

Asked where the timetable of a year to the complete the inquiry came from, the PMS said that the exact timetable was a matter for the Committee. The Prime Minister had set out his views as to why these things couldn t be looked at in a piecemeal way. The initial Franks inquiry took six months and that was only looking at three months previous to the Falklands conflict. The Iraq inquiry was much more wide-ranging and covered a much longer time period. Therefore the expectation of a year seemed reasonable, given the complexity and detail that the Committee would have to look at.

Asked if there had been any discussions with opposition parties regarding the membership of the Committee, the PMS said that there had been discussions with opposition parties on the nature of the inquiry and some of the membership names.

Asked what the argument was for having a private inquiry, the PMS said that we would be taking evidence in private but the whole report would be published. The Prime Minister had said that he would like as much evidence that could be made public, to be made public.

Put that the Hutton report had been carried out publicly, the PMS said that a delicate judgement had to be made and people had strongly held views on the subject. The easiest thing in the world for the Prime Minister would have been to say that we should have a public inquiry, but in his view, had we opted for a full public inquiry we would not necessarily have been able to properly understand the reasons for what happened and learn from them, which was our overriding objective.

Asked if the inquiry would look into the part the US played in the war, the PMS said that the inquiry was looking at the UK involvement in Iraq and what the lessons might be. It was a matter for the Committee to consider what the appropriate issues were for them to look at in order to establish the right lessons for the UK.

Asked if it was a matter for the Committee as to which documents were withheld from the public, the PMS said that the Committee would have to take a view on that. No doubt they would want to consult the Cabinet Secretary and others as to what the national security implications could be. The Prime Minister had made clear that he would like to see as much information as possible in the public domain.

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» Monday, June 15, 2009

Iraq Inquiry

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