Downing Street Says » Afghanistan

Asked of it wasn’t time for the Government to make a statement about Afghanistan, the PMOS said that in terms of troop numbers that was a matter for the operational assessment on the ground and discussion between the commanders on the ground and staff here. In terms of the role of the UK in Afghanistan, that had been set out by John Reid and by Des Browne and no doubt Des Browne would continue to set out the analysis of the situation. Above all what was important was to remember what the mission was there to achieve. The mission was there to help the first democratically elected Government in Afghanistan to extend its control into the Southern area of the country and stop the Taliban wrecking that process of building infrastructure, building local economies, and building local administrations.

Put to him that the Brigadier in charge had requested more equipment and particularly more air support, the PMOS repeated that it was a matter of assessment for commanders on the ground and for discussion between them and the people they reported to here. It was first of all a military assessment and a military decision. It was not a political decision. Put to him that there seemed to be a clear need for further resources and the Prime Minister was in a position to grant that, the PMOS said again that it was military decision to be made by the commanders on the ground. In terms of the resources, those had been identified by the military commanders and those were supplied. Equally if there was a case for more resources then that was an internal military discussion which would take place. Asked if he was saying that the Prime Minister had no involvement in that decision, the PMOS said that what he relied on was the advice he got from his military advisors. There were proper procedures for handling this kind of operation and those procedures were being followed.

The PMOS noted that there had been some suggestion in last week’s coverage of this that there had been a special meeting about this involving the Prime Minister, he wanted to be clear that he didn’t recognise that account. The Prime Minister regularly received reports but he was guided by the advice he received from his military commanders as was proper.

Put to him that the situation on the ground in Afghanistan had changed quite a bit since John Reid had made his statement on it, the PMOS said again that we depended on the military assessment that we got from the commanders on the ground. He was not going to give a running commentary on the situation on the ground because it would not be appropriate for him to do so. Put to him that if it were the case that we had thought we were dealing with the last vestiges of a military force and had then discovered that that force had regrouped that we would usually pass on, the PMOS said that, with respect, that was not the assessment that was given by the people who appeared on the airwaves from Afghanistan. Yes they had met stiff opposition and we had expected stiff opposition. It was better that the people who spoke about this were those who were close to the operation.

Asked of he was saying that we were not going to be granting more troops to Afghanistan but perhaps there might be a change in the configuration of forces, the PMOS said that what he was saying was that we should take this process step-by-step. In terms of the decision making process it was first and foremost a matter for the military assessment on the ground, for that military assessment to passed to their superiors here and for the appropriate process to be gone through. He was not going to get into speculating about what was being suggested, this should be done properly. Asked if any request had been received by the appropriate people, the PMOS said that that was a question for the MOD because first and foremost it came within the military system. Asked if it wasn’t the case that the military was stretched already, the PMOS said no. If extra resources were required then they would be found, but that was first and foremost a matter for the military assessment and for military commanders to decide, not politicians.

Asked if the phrase "extending control" wasn’t simply another way of describing the conquering of Afghanistan, the PMOS said that was a stupid question. We were in Afghanistan at the invitation of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. Put to him that that was disputed, the PMOS said it wasn’t disputed. 6 million Afghan people had voted for that government, all of whom had a more legitimate right to express their view about the future of their country then we did sitting here in London. Asked to explain what extending control actually meant, the PMOS said that what it meant was that we were establishing, for the first time, a proper a system of government in Afghanistan and we were doing so at the request of the democratically elected Afghani government, as expressed through their representatives elected by the Afghan people.

Asked if there might be a statement in Parliament nonetheless given recent events, the PMOS said that he wasn’t aware of any plans for a statement at this stage, it would be a matter for the MOD to assess whether a statement was necessary. The Prime Minister and the Government deeply regretted the deaths of any British troops who died. However we also had to be wary of having a statement very time British soldiers died. The important thing was to have a statement whenever there was something new to say. That was a matter for the MOD along with the representatives of the House to decide, not for Downing Street.

Asked if the British army had underestimated the situation in Afghanistan, the PMOS said that if people looked at the briefing he gave after Cabinet had decided the issue of Afghanistan, it was clear that there were ample warnings there of the difficulties we anticipated facing, of the fact that this was going to be tough mission, and that Cabinet was fully aware that this was going to be a tough mission. Nobody was under any illusions at this point that this was anything other than a difficult undertaking. Unfortunately that had proved to be the case. Equally however nobody was under any doubt of the value of the mission, precisely because of the reasons he had outlined. Des Browne had set those out whenever he had met President Karzai in Afghanistan.

Asked if we had sufficient resources to subjugate the militants in Afghanistan, the PMOS said firstly this wasn’t about subjugation, this was about establishing democratic control. That was very very different. We were extending democratic control at the will of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. Asked of we had the resources to do that, the PMOS said that we had assessed what resources were needed and as always that level of resources was kept under review.

Asked if the objectives of the campaign had changed, where initially we had been a peace-keeping operation and now we were involved in a full campaign, the PMOS said no. That was a caricature which had been wrong from the beginning. What this role had always been about was helping the Afghan government extending its control. That was the way he had presented it on the day that the Cabinet had made its decision, and that was the way it had always been presented. It was not a search and destroy mission, which was the US led operation. This was establishing control and then defending itself against attacks if those attacks came. That was a very important distinction between very different roles as had been made clear from the beginning.

Asked if we had spoken to Pakistan about this situation, the PMOS said that we were in continuing discussions with the Pakistani Government about all sorts of matters.

Asked how much time the British army spent defending themselves compared to how much time they spent doing the job they were there to do, the PMOS said that depended on how much they were attacked. What British forces wanted to do was help the Afghan people establish the necessary means for democratic governments to survive and prosper. How much they were able to do that and how much time they had spent defending military operations depended on the level of attacks they faced. The Taliban had the opportunity to stand in Afghani elections, those that did hadn’t done very well, that was democracy at work.

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» Monday, July 3, 2006

Afghanistan

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