Downing Street Says » WMD/45 Minutes

Asked the Prime Minister’s reaction to Robin Cook’s comments yesterday regarding what he had known about the 45-minute claim, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that the Prime Minister’s recollection of his conversation with Mr Cook last March was that they had not discussed the 45-minute point nor the issue of strategic/battlefield WMD. Rather, they had talked about the threat to UK troops from battlefield WMD. The PMOS also took the opportunity to remind journalists that Mr Cook had not mentioned the 45-minute point in his resignation speech because it had not been an issue at that point. Despite the lengthy clarifications and explanations at this morning’s briefing, it was still being reported at lunchtime today that, because the 45 minutes referred to battlefield munitions, the Government had not believed that there was a threat from long range missiles. That was simply not the case. It was not a question of either or. The Government believed there had been a threat from both, as described on page 22 of the Dossier relating to Iraq’s capability to deploy chemical and biological weapons through al-Hussein ballistic missiles which had a range of 650km, for example. It was important for people to recognise that the long-range capability claim had never rested on the 45-minutes intelligence.

Questioned about the comments from the Leader of the Opposition today suggesting that the Prime Minister had gone to war without bothering to ask if the chemical and biological weapons he thought Iraq had had could only be used on the battlefield or could be put on the end of a missile and fired on our troops in Cyprus, the PMOS referred journalists to page 22 of the Dossier which stated:

“Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include:

The belief of the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Government and intelligence services around the world was that Saddam had had a WMD capability which was both battlefield and long-range. The 45-minute claim gave precision in terms of the state of readiness but did not affect the overall assessment. The long-range issue was, in any event, not based on the 45-minute intelligence. Questioned about Cyprus and the 45-minute claim, the PMOS pointed out that in his interim ISG report, David Kay had talked about Iraq producing missiles with a range of 1,000km. It was not a question of ‘whether’ the Government believed Saddam had had that capability based around the 45-minute point. We believed he had had it.

Asked when Geoff Hoon had realised that the 45-minute claim had referred to battlefield weapons, the PMOS said that Mr Hoon had answered that point in his Select Committee hearing this morning. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that the content of the Dossier accurately reflected the intelligence of the time. We had never claimed that the 45-minute point was linked to long-range missiles. Some people were saying that the Prime Minister didn’t know or didn’t care about the difference between long and short range. That was simply not true. When our forces had gone into combat, for example, they had been equipped with protective suits on the premise that Saddam had a capability that could be deployed in a battlefield context. Asked if he was seriously suggesting that no one had told the Prime Minister what the 45-minute claim had referred to, the PMOS said yes. The Prime Minister and Government believed that Saddam had had both a short and long range WMD capability and that was the important point. In a PQ answered recently, the Prime Minister had said that the 45-minute claim had added precision but had not affected the overall intelligence assessment. Asked why Robin Cook, as then Leader of the House, had known the 45-minute claim had referred to battlefield WMD but the Prime Minister had not, the PMOS said that Mr Cook had obviously had a conversation with representatives from the intelligence agencies. He pointed out that the significance that was being attached to this piece of information was disproportionate. Journalists appeared to be rewriting the history of the build-up to the conflict. Everything had not been predicated on the 45-minute claim. It had only become a big issue when it had been made a big issue – in May 2003. The Prime Minister’s motivational factor in the build-up to war was the fact than Saddam had been in breach of countless UN Resolutions and, as a result, there had been a threat from both his battlefield and long-range missiles – a point of view shared by the international community. Asked why the Prime Minister had admitted that he had not known in March 2003 to what the 45-minute claim had referred, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had been asked a straight question and he had given a straight answer.

Asked again why Downing Street had not made much of an effort to correct any misapprehensions reported by the media relating to the 45-minute claim – in contrast to the allegations made by Andrew Gilligan, the PMOS said that if journalists reviewed the media coverage from that time, they would find that most of the press had not linked the 45 minutes to long range missiles. The Government had not put the 45-minute claim in the Dossier and then done everything they could to make it the one big issue between 24 September and 18 March. He did not think we had even discussed it in a briefing during that time. We had certainly not held a briefing on the day of the Dossier’s publication according to his recollection. Nor had the Prime Minister mentioned it in his Statement to the House in March. We believed that Saddam had had both battlefield and long-range capabilities. It was not as if he had been allowed to have the former but not the latter or vice versa.

Asked if any Downing Street official had spoken to a journalist on the day the Dossier had been published and had drawn their attention to a particular part of it, the PMOS said that he was unable to account for all conversations from No 10. However, one piece of evidence in the Hutton Inquiry had been an e-mail which he had sent to his colleague and Alastair Campbell suggesting that the Press Office should not hold a press briefing on the morning of the Dossier’s publication but that we should let the Prime Minister’s words in the House on that day speak for themselves. As he had told the Hutton Inquiry, the 45-minute claim had been new intelligence, so it was obviously going to be reported as new. That was the definition of news.

Asked again about the Evening Standard report on 24 September 2002 and why, given Jonathan Powell’s e-mail asking what the headline should be, nothing was done to correct the paper’s misapprehension, the PMOS said that as he understood it, the Standard had made the distinction between those weapons on standby for use within 45 minutes and those which could reach Cyprus. That was not to say that the 45-minute point was not newsworthy and should not have been reported. It was on both counts. However, a rounded view of how the media had reported the Dossier as a whole the next day showed that most had not linked the two. Put to him that the way the Dossier had been presented had led people to think that the two points were related – a misapprehension, which the Government had not bothered to correct, the PMOS said that were it to be shown that the Government had no evidence to back up its belief that Saddam had a long range capability, that would be a completely different discussion. However, there was evidence – and it hadn’t been underpinned by the 45-minute claim, as some appeared to be seeking to suggest.

In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that if the Prime Minister was being accused of a dereliction of duty in terms of his duty of care to our forces, he would point out that our forces had gone into combat with the view that Saddam had chemical and biological battlefield and long-range weapons and had been give protective equipment accordingly.

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» Thursday, February 5, 2004

WMD/45 Minutes

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